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Learning from the reality of disasters that have been experienced or which 
have been learned vicariously from the experience of other people and 
communities, empowers people to reduce their vulnerability and to enhance 
their resilience in the face of catastrophe.  Unfortunately the process of 
learning is neither as obvious nor as commonsense as the drama and tragedy 
of an unfolding disaster demands. Lessons are not fully learned, the missing 
details may become fatal flaws in people’s understanding of events, and 
reconstruction of events from the perspectives of participants, observers and 
analysts are necessarily piecemeal, driven by drama, economy and politics, 
un-contextualised and unique. Learning from past disasters is not a simple 
or obvious process.  This chapter begins with reflections on perception; 
scale; emphasis; and place, in order to understand some of the diversity of 
disaster learning experiences.  Examples of lessons learned from local, 
regional and distant disasters provide a review in order to identify issues, 
commonalities (within unique events) and those mitigative actions that may 
reduce each person’s and each community’s vulnerability to a range of 
hazards, and simultaneously enhance their resilience before, during and 
after a catastrophic event. 
 
Do communities or individuals learn anything from the experience of the 
disaster?  Is vulnerability to future events reduced by direct experience or 
indirectly experiencing disaster, and/or is resilience enhanced?  The 
Integrated Emergency Management System model of Prevention, 
Preparedness, Response and Recovery assumes a continual feedback loop.  
Emergency managers are required to learn from each disaster through 
debriefing, studies, reorganisation, and redefinition of priorities. 
 
Many lessons learned for communities by emergency managers are passed 
down to communities through education, warnings, information, mitigation, 
physical prevention structures, planning and intervention.  Emergency 
managers, as professionals, have a more global view and their job of 
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protecting communities is to learn lessons from all disasters in order to 
improve mitigation and capacity to respond and to aid recovery.  
 
The problem for emergency managers in indirectly learning from other 
disasters is that experience comes second hand from other participants and 
must then be processed, redefined, understood and transmitted third hand 
to communities for which they are responsible.  At the same time individuals 
and communities learn of other disaster experiences primarily through the 
media, and sort information and structure other people’s experiences to fit 
their own situation and place.  This process at community level is much more 
piecemeal than that of emergency management.  However, it is also location 
and situation specific, whereas the emergency managers’ sorting and 
understanding of others’ experiences is directed to responsibility for many 
communities – the whole state, or nation, or even an international region. 
Thus at the initial level of learning indirectly from other communities’ 
disasters and experiences, there are two radically different learning 
experiences.  The emergency manager’s learned experience is top-down and 
global, while the community’s is bottom-up and personal.  
 
Post-disaster Studies 
 
The first stages of a disaster response require rapid appraisals to assess 
needs and response levels. Needs analyses inevitably form part of the 
briefings and may contribute to deeper reflections and lessons that can be 
learned, especially at the organisational level. However their primary 
function is to satisfy immediate needs under pressure.  Researchers are often 
not involved at this initial stage.  Researchers usually visit the scene of a 
disaster within a few days, or up to a week or so, after an event.  The aim is to 
keep out of the way of response teams, and researchers do not enter a 
declared disaster area until they have been granted permission from the 
authorities who are primarily involved in response and relief.  The aim of the 
post-disaster research is to record issues, experiences and impacts, while 
these are fresh in people’s minds.  These studies are also primarily records of 
what happened in an event, but they form the first stage of attempting to 
analyse issues and ultimately to synthesise disaster experiences into more 
general conclusions that can inform policy. 
 
Enormous numbers of post-disaster studies and reports are available, 
ranging from measurements of purely physical impacts to records of highly 
personal human experiences.  For tropical cyclones and hurricanes alone, 
Haig (2004) brought together over 200 studies into a web site International 
Post Cyclone Database. This database cross references individual studies 
according to their titles, keywords, survey aims, type, study area, 
methodology, key findings, events name, date, location, cities, states and 
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countries.  As further events are added, comparisons of issues impacts and 
experiences are enhanced. 
 
A review of 130 post-disaster studies (King, 2002) summarised places, 
events, types of disasters and classified their methods. As the USA and 
Australia had funding programs for post-disaster surveys, the majority of 
these reports were written by USA and Australian researchers although 
because US-based research could obtain funding to examine overseas 
disasters, many studies of events in other parts of the world had been carried 
out by US-based researchers.  Of the 130 studies that were examined, 29 
were cyclones/hurricanes, 21 were floods and 13 earthquakes, with eight 
bushfires and nine tornadoes. These were the dominant disasters in a list 
that also covered human induced hazards. These five hazard groups are the 
major killers, but to an extent are predictable, with appropriate behaviour 
and preparatory actions that can be taken to reduce vulnerability and 
impact.  As these were all post-disaster studies they were all consequently 
case studies of specific events, occasionally more than one, but primarily 
concerned with a single disaster on those issues related to a place and time. 
 
Members of the Centre for Disaster Studies carried out a series of post 
disaster studies between 1997 and 2006 covering 16 separate disasters in 20 
different locations (see Table 3.1). With the exception of the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami and human induced disasters like the Bali bombing, all were floods 
and cyclones and in particular the events were concentrated in local 
communities. 
 
The first event in Table 3.1 below, Cyclone Gillian, was a non event but a 
warning to the Bureau of Meteorology about the lack of preparation.  No 
warning had been issued to a major Queensland urban area since the 
beginning of the decade.  This category one cyclone dissipated before 
reaching the coast, however, it occurred in the middle of a working day and 
the experience illustrated chaos in the manner in which schools and 
workplaces were closed down as well as a general lack of preparation. 
 
Two much later studies took up a related theme of severe category 5 cyclone 
warnings in communities that subsequently were spared impact or received 
much less impact than expected. In 2005 Cyclone Ingrid crossed Cape York 
Peninsula but missed all the communities it had threatened and in 2006 
Cyclone Monica crossed the Peninsula and deepened into a very severe 
category 5 as it skirted the Northern Territory. Monica weakened to a 
category 3 when it finally crossed over Darwin. Surveys targeted people’s 
attitudes to preparing for the worst and not going through it, the ‘cry wolf’ 
syndrome. Research showed a high level of tolerance for being fully warned. 
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A Litany of Disasters 
 
Table 3.1 Post-disaster studies carried out by the Centre for Disaster 
Studies, 1997-2006 
 
Place Year Hazard Name Research Method 
Townsville 1997 Cyclone Gillian Questionnaire, 
warnings & behaviour 
Cloncurry 1997 Flood  Questionnaire, 
interviews 
Cairns 
Mareeba 
Innisfail 
 
1997 
 
Cyclone 
 
Justin 
Longitudinal 
questionnaire & short 
survey questionnaire 
Townsville 1998 Floods (ex-Cyclone 
Syd) 
Household telephone, 
business & Magnetic 
Island surveys 
interviews 
Burketown 
Normanton 
Karumba 
 
1998 
 
Floods 
 Questionnaire, 
interviews 
Innisfail Flooded buildings 
survey 
Cairns – Barron River 
suburbs 
Evacuation 
questionnaire 
Port Douglas & 
Mosman 
Warnings & behaviour 
questionnaire 
Wujal Wujal 
 
 
1999 
 
 
Cyclone 
 
 
Rona 
Warnings & impact 
interviews 
Broome 2000 Cyclone Rosita Questionnaire, 
interviews 
Cairns 2000 Cyclone Steve Longitudinal 
questionnaire 
Mornington Island 2001 Cyclone Abigail Questionnaire, 
interviews 
Sierra Leone 2002 Civil War  Interviews, meetings, 
secondary data 
Bali 2003 Terrorism  Interviews, meetings, 
secondary data 
Tikopia, Solomons 
Anuta, Solomons 
2003 
 
Cyclone Zoe Basic needs 
assessment 
Phuket, Thailand 
Maldives 
2005 Tsunami Indian Ocean 
tsunami 
Interviews, 
observations, field 
measurements, 
secondary data  
Port Douglas 2005 Cyclone Ingrid Interviews, 
questionnaire 
Innisfail & nearby 
communities 
2006 Cyclone Larry Interviews, 
questionnaire 
Darwin 2006 Cyclone Monica Telephone survey 
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Centre for Disaster Studies researcher, Anderson-Berry, focussed on the 
northern beaches of Cairns during 1996 to measure cyclone awareness and 
preparedness in a community that had not experienced a cyclone threat for 
six years.  In 1997 the giant Cyclone Justin, filled the Coral Sea and took a 
month before finally crossing the Cairns northern beaches coast line as a 
category 2. This was an opportunity to resurvey experience and behaviour 
amongst the same population that had completed the awareness and 
preparedness survey only six months earlier. Making this a truly longitudinal 
study, category 2 Cyclone Steve in 2000 passed over the same communities 
(Anderson-Berry & King, 2005). A high proportion of residents who had 
taken part in the earlier surveys were still available to participate in the third 
study, providing a valuable measure of a small but significant increase in 
community awareness and preparedness. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Cyclone Tessi damaged Townsville’s Strand in 2000, just 
after reconstruction had been completed following severe 
damage caused in 1998 floods. 
 
Other cyclones provided further opportunities to pursue awareness and 
preparedness, but also to examine issues of warnings and hazard 
perceptions. Cyclone Abigail in 2001 was only a category two, but it passed 
over a low-lying Indigenous community at Mornington Island, where Eddie 
McLachlan, a Centre for Disaster Studies researcher was already recording 
indigenous hazard knowledge.  Just as this study was oriented to a particular 
emphasis, similarly Cyclone Rosita at Broome in 2000 was an opportunity to 
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concentrate on an issue, by looking at the impact on a tourist location.  The 
vulnerability of tourists and tourist destinations has developed as a major 
research area for the Centre, not just because of its significance on the 
Queensland coast but principally because of the lack of crisis management in 
the tourist industry. 
 
In 1999, Cyclone Rona initiated a series of issues. Post-disaster studies 
following the passage of this exceptionally wet cyclone addressed different 
issues in locations that were over 200 km apart.  This cyclone was preceded 
and accompanied by flooding rains and crossed the coast at Cow Bay in the 
Daintree rainforest. Wujal Wujal and Bloomfield communities to the north 
(around 1000 Indigenous and Non-indigenous residents) were totally 
isolated for weeks and failed to notice formal warnings of the close proximity 
of the cyclone. Anderson-Berry’s initial visit to the community was followed 
by a series of studies as researchers in the Centre directed emphasis to 
remote and Indigenous communities, examining their vulnerability, 
resilience and warnings.  South of Cyclone Rona’s eye, Douglas Shire was 
fairly well-prepared but the controversial issue was the efficacy of warnings. 
The post-disaster surveys in Port Douglas and Mosman were concerned with 
this issue of official warnings and their effectiveness.  While the survey at 
that time showed a satisfactory level of awareness and preparedness, a 
similar kind of survey was carried out in the same locations in 2005 after 
category 5 Cyclone Ingrid had passed (ultimately crossing Cape York 
Peninsula but causing very little damage).  In this case the survey was carried 
out for the opposite purpose of eliciting community response to what the 
media had termed a ‘false alarm’.  Community attitudes towards their 
preparations were positive, as it should be, but the issue of false alarm 
perceptions remains a concern to emergency managers. 
 
Cyclone Rona’s passage dumped vast amounts of rain on the Atherton 
Tablelands to the west of Cairns, causing the Barron River to flood.  This 
river emerges from the mountain range on to the coastal plain of Cairns 
adjacent to the suburbs of Lake Placid and Caravonica.  As the river rose 
rapidly, authorities issued an evacuation order to all residents of these two 
suburbs during the middle of the night.  The post-disaster survey in Cairns 
was therefore a detailed questionnaire issued to all households that had 
evacuated, to record their problems, perceptions and experiences. Of value to 
the Cairns City Council, which had not previously conducted an evacuation, 
the survey also illustrated the controversial issue of pets in evacuation 
centres.  More than 80% of households took pets with them, from cats and 
dogs to some truly bizarre creatures.  As a consequence the Cairns City 
Council followed up the pets issue in council surveys that were carried out 
during 2004. 
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The fourth of the Cyclone Rona studies also concentrated on flood 
experiences in Innisfail, 90 km south of Cairns, where houses and 
commercial properties in low-lying areas adjacent to the Johnstone River 
were inundated. The survey stressed property damage and loss related 
directly to house type (especially low or high set) and measured precise flood 
levels on property and within buildings. 
 
Cyclone Larry in March 2006 was in a sense ‘the big one’ that had been 
feared for many years, but it just missed a coastal city (either Cairns or 
Townsville could have been severely impacted upon). Once again it was 
Innisfail that was the victim along with surrounding small communities and 
villages on the coastal plain and on the Atherton Tableland. This impact area 
experienced a category 5 that rapidly weakened to a 4 but remained a severe 
4 until it had passed the Tableland. Although a rural area, the affected 
population of more than 50,000 people was scattered through many small 
towns and communities. The lesson learned from household surveys was of a 
well prepared, experienced and knowledgeable community that behaved 
correctly and consequently experienced no loss of life and few injuries. 
 
Many floods in northern Australia are related to cyclonic weather systems, 
but there were significant differences in the three sets of post-flood surveys.  
At Cloncurry in 1997 the Cloncurry River rose rapidly to unprecedented 
levels, inundating parts of the town, thereby forcing the evacuation of people 
and property.  The Gulf of Carpentaria lowland floods the following year 
inundated a vast area, as the great rivers that drain into the Gulf coalesced 
into an inland sea.  Towns and communities in the region became islands 
with problems and issues that emanated from their isolation: lack of food; 
inundation of septic systems; loss of power and freshwater; a strong risk of 
secondary disease and infection; and widespread destruction of roads, 
drainage, bridges and culverts.  Most remote cattle stations have 
traditionally stocked up on provisions for the isolation of the wet season but 
the predominantly Indigenous small towns and Aboriginal communities lack 
that capacity.  Most households have low incomes, high dependency on 
welfare and are unable to stockpile supplies.  Because of this characteristic of 
the market, retailers are also restricted in their ability to stock up.  Despite 
these problems these isolated communities were remarkably resilient.  The 
communities endured and made do with what they had available. 
 
Stoic endurance is easily attributed to the social construction of the outback 
community.  Certainly post-disaster studies undertaken by the Centre 
illustrated many examples of the term ‘outback spirit’. However, the same 
spirit of neighbourliness was equally evident in Townsville during the 1998 
flood.  This was an extreme rain event (a consequence of a decayed cyclone, 
in which over 700 mm of rain fell in less than 24 hours) with creek flash 
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flooding causing severe damage in a small number of locations.  While 
carrying out a 1000 household telephone survey in the days following the 
flood, interviewers recorded many remarkable anecdotes of bravery and 
selflessness, as well as some of the problems of inappropriate behaviour.   
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Damage to the Black River settlement in Thuringowa following 
floods in 1998. 
 
Despite having used a variety of research methods and approaches these 
mainly local events involving predictable and regular hazards of flood and 
cyclone demonstrated some general trends and impacts.   
 
The following general trends and impacts have been noted: 
 
• unequal distribution of the hazard impact; 
• loss of essential services during and for a period after the hazard event; 
• lack of expectation in the community of the severity of the impact; 
• late or minimal preparation for the hazard; 
• response and assistance within the community and between 
neighbours; 
• confusion concerning warnings, and especially the way in which they 
were portrayed and transmitted by the media; 
• a level of resilience which involved acceptance of the hazard and 
generally a lack of attribution of serious blame. 
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This idea of acceptance of natural hazards was expressed by a Thai informant 
in Phuket during the week following the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 that 
it was easier in an emotional or psychological sense to deal with natural 
hazards rather than terror.  This sentiment encapsulates an aspect of 
community resilience that to some extent accepts natural hazards as part of 
the natural order, something over which little control is possible. War and 
terror on the other hand undermine people’s faith in human nature, threaten 
all of our humanity and may even be a direct physical threat.  
 
Immediate post-tsunami disaster observations in Thailand also suggested 
lessons that can be learned from the devastation which could be applied 
directly to other hazards and other areas, such as coastal Australia (King & 
Gurtner, 2005).  Tsunami damage resembled many aspects of storm surge 
damage.   
 
The immediate response to the tsunami in many parts of the world was a 
transfer and internalisation of the threat.  While tsunamis may occur in 
many parts of the world’s plate boundaries, cyclones and hurricanes are 
much more regular an occurrence, with the storm surge accompanying a 
severe storm being just as destructive as a tsunami albeit over a longer 
period of time and with a greater opportunity for evacuation. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Storm surge damage at Tikopia Solomon Islands, left, and 
tsunami damage at Phuket Thailand, right. 
 
Other significant transfers of the tsunami experience relate to the 
vulnerability of critical infrastructure and lifelines.  Particularly noticeable 
on Phuket was the lack of damage to significant infrastructure, with response 
coming from the intact and functioning administrative centre.  Recovery was 
able to progress rapidly despite widespread destruction in the coastal zone.  
This would probably not be the case in Australian coastal settlements where 
far too much of the critical infrastructure, economy and services are in low 
lying or coastal locations.  Land use planning and building structure 
locations were identified as significant issues for post-tsunami mitigation. 
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Similarly in Australia there are many people in the community who oppose 
development along coastal foreshores because of the extreme vulnerability of 
this zone to storm surge.  As the primary tourist resource is the beach and 
the sea, it is inevitable that pressure for development on the foreshore will 
continue to come from the tourist industry, whether in Thailand or northern 
Australia.  The Indian Ocean tsunami caused particularly severe damage to 
small buildings on the foreshore, a lesson that is directly transferable to 
residential absolute beach frontage. 
 
In Thailand the impact of the tsunami was felt particularly strongly in the 
tourist industry, tourists themselves and tourist workers.  Tourists have 
often been omitted from community hazard mitigation efforts and yet they 
are especially vulnerable. The need for hazard education was highlighted by 
the tsunami.  Education needs to be targeted to diverse communities, 
including tourists and tourism operators as separate identifiable 
communities.  Warning systems for both tsunamis and cyclones can only be 
effective if communities are educated to understand what the warning means 
and how to behave. 
 
Hazard Experience and Emergency Management 
 
There are common themes in emergency managers’ and researchers’ 
perspectives on the lessons that can be learned from disasters.  There are 
also common patterns and processes that are identified in similar types of 
disasters.  Yet while a particular level of flood, category of cyclone or scale of 
earthquake may demonstrate similar processes, the resulting disasters are all 
different.  Location, culture, society, politics, organisation, awareness and 
many other factors all contribute to the unique features of each disaster.  To 
learn lessons from disasters it is important to recognise commonalities while 
being aware of that which is unique, or specific to the location.  Researchers 
and emergency managers do this by recognising the special circumstances of 
each catastrophe and identify those factors as part of the explanation. There 
are many examples in studies of previous disasters that identify both those 
factors that are common and those which are unique.   
 
For example Keys (2005), reporting on the 2002 floods in Germany and the 
Czech Republic identified the dismantling of former warning mechanisms 
and changing land management systems as an emergency management issue 
that could be transferred to the Australian experience, but at the same time 
he was impressed by the scale of the disaster which gave it its unique 
characteristics. Bankoff’s (2003) assessment of flooding in the Philippines 
also recognises environmental problems, alongside the complexity of social 
and environmental factors, but he reduces the uniqueness to the social 
construction of vulnerability.  Both writers stress the importance of 
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understanding historical changes and processes to understand current 
hazards, but bring quite different perspectives on the nature of society. 
 
The perspective brought by the researcher to a disaster event configures the 
lessons that may be learned and transmitted.  Emergency managers are 
particularly involved in organisation and the political system.  The limited 
number of questions and surveys that are available to researchers result in 
specific selections. Prater and Wu’s (2002) study of Taiwan's 1999 
earthquake was oriented to analysis of organisational and institutional 
responses.  Similarly Wachtendorf’s (2000) study of the Red River flood 
positively emphasised cross border political arrangements; in this instance 
the US/Canada border. Betts (2003) on the other hand found institutional 
failings in flood warning systems in Victoria.  The research perspective was 
from the bottom-up community level. Wachtendorf’s was much more a view 
from the top down. Where researchers stand, or come from, influences the 
issues seen and the lessons learnt.  This does not mean that one view is 
wrong and another right.  All are real reflections of disastrous events, but the 
lesson that is learned is perhaps less from the event than from the observer. 
Pfister’s (2002) assessment of Grafton's floods in 2001 identified a poor 
response to evacuation warnings and concluded a need for better warning 
education.  As an emergency manager, this observation is Pfister’s role and 
the correct view of community. However, community workers in southern 
India, Thomalla and Schmuck (2004) observed a similar sort of community 
response in Orissa in 1999 and concluded failures in government and NGO 
organisations as well as in the communities themselves.  However, an 
overview of two decades of hazard research in southern India by Winchester 
(2000) concluded that NGOs had been effective but the crucial need was to 
target the poor who make up the bulk of the victims. 
 
Many post-disaster studies examine post-traumatic stress, most are carried 
out by psychologists and psychiatrists and are often much more longitudinal 
in scope.  Some emphasise the relief workers, others the victims. Johnes 
(2000) for example examined the impact of the Aberfan spoil heap collapse 
over 30 years after the event and Blatt (2001) subsequent to a mine disaster 
in Austria, both in order to assess failures in government and media that 
hampered recovery.  The lessons learned were organisational although the 
emphasis was trauma. Jonkman and Kelman (2005) identified inappropriate 
behaviour as a cause of flood deaths, and Gordon (2004), reflecting on a 
range of emergencies, concluded that social processes and relationships are 
drained and undermined during and following a disaster.  The trauma and 
grief experienced by victims and survivors is not necessarily just a 
consequence of the actual hazard, but is constructed or exacerbated by other 
processes that are equally part of the disaster - organisational and social 
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failings, the lopsided construction of the event by the media and a lack of 
appropriate knowledge. 
 
Because a disaster is a terrible and destructive experience, researchers and 
emergency managers are invariably driven to find explanations as to why 
things went wrong in order to mitigate against future disasters.  Post-
disaster surveys and reflective papers can be expected to identify 
shortcomings.  However, there is a significant category of positive analyses.  
These may broadly be put into groups of resilience and education.  Recent 
resilience papers cover events of great diversity: destruction of the World 
Trade Center (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003), recovery and sustainability in 
Kobe (Shaw & Goda, 2004), community first aid response after the 
Northridge earthquake (Kano et al., 2005), social and ecological resilience 
(Adger et al., 2005), and emotional and psychological response and 
resilience following the Katherine floods of 1998 (Skertchly & Skertchly, 
2000). Handmer and Hillman (2004) also illustrate the importance of 
economic recovery in enhancing resilience following a range of Australian 
disasters. 
 
Resilience is the key to learning from disasters.  Studies that find flaws and 
organisational failings that have contributed to a disaster, stress 
vulnerability.  At the community level when levels of impact and loss are 
identified it is clear which groups or locations in the community were the 
most vulnerable in a specific crisis.  The outcome should then be a reduction 
of the vulnerability of those people and places.  However, the things that 
make people vulnerable are often structural social issues.  Poverty, ethnic 
isolation, infrastructural disadvantage, low levels of education, and such 
factors as complex as cultural practices and beliefs are areas of community 
vulnerability that are outside the control of the emergency manager. 
 
While identifying factors of vulnerability to a disaster helps in understanding 
the process, these may not necessarily be the route by which vulnerability is 
reduced.  By building on the resilience of society and strengthening positive 
factors, vulnerable communities may become more empowered to minimise 
the impact of future hazard events. Such empowerment mainly involves 
organisational and social change at the community level.  Awareness and 
preparedness empower people to deal with their own situation and location.  
The two most direct influences on awareness and preparedness are direct 
experience and education.  Education often begins with media accounts and 
images of disasters in other places – the news.  News accounts initiate 
awareness, but awareness in itself can run into the arid wastes of fear, unless 
it is backed up by preparedness behaviour that is based on the strengths, 
capacity and resilience of communities.  The media goes part of the way in 
taking some responsibility for preparedness by informing people of actions 
 
45 
they can take, but shortcomings of media coverage are their needs for drama 
and for stories that are piecemeal and often not at all reflective of the real 
situation of a disaster.  The media also lacks an interest in hazards when 
there is no immediate threat, unless this can be personalised by events like 
scientist and politician confrontations. 
 
The greatest advantage of media coverage it is that it is potentially free 
education. Every other education and awareness campaign costs emergency 
management organisations money.  However, a major inexpensive and 
highly effective route to awareness and preparedness action is through 
education in schools (Finnis et al., 2004; Izadkhah & Hosseini, 2005). The 
effective cost of hazard education in school is a transfer of attention away 
from other subjects, but generally hazard modules are well integrated into 
social and environmental studies education.  Apart from well taught hazards 
education being exciting and interesting to children, it is effective in laying 
down knowledge and action that may be absorbed by the child for life and 
which are also communicated to family, relatives and friends in the broader 
community through homework, projects and explanation. 
 
Beyond the school, public awareness involves complex and costly strategies. 
O’Neil (2004) illustrates a range of individual social attitudes to hazards that 
may form the basis for specific targets and approaches of warnings and 
awareness campaigns.  O’Neil’s summary table below highlights different 
attitudes within the community. 
 
Table 3.2 Hazard awareness targets 
 
Concerned with the same 
hazard as the agency 
Target this group with hazard specific 
information & messages & focus on how 
they will manage their response to the risk 
(i.e. what to do in a cyclone) 
 
 
 
Risk averse 
Concerned with different 
hazards to the agency 
Target this group with non-hazard specific 
safety initiatives (What to do in an 
emergency) 
Agency partnerships 
Risk tolerant Ambivalent about the 
hazard or the effect upon 
them 
Target this group with general information 
about the hazard.  Highlight the risk from 
the hazard and how it will affect their 
family. 
Risk deniers Denies that the hazard will 
occur or that it will affect 
them. 
Target this group with messages that build 
the credibility and authority of the agency. 
Risk seekers Sees a disaster as an 
opportunity to become 
involved in rescue efforts or 
to pursue their interests 
During event, warn of dangers & penalties 
for interfering with work of emergency 
agencies. After the event, target with 
specific messages relating to safety for 
individuals and families. 
Source: O’Neil, 2004 
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Research into disaster impact on communities shows clearly that direct 
experience of a disaster is a particularly powerful awareness education event 
(Paton et al., 2001; Comstock & Mallonee, 2005; Anderson-Berry & King, 
2005).  It is common sense to expect hazard impacted communities to have 
developed greater awareness and to have responded by adopting appropriate 
preparations.  Research shows that this happens as predicted, but not to 
such a high level as might be expected.  The average community response is 
greater, but direct experience of a disaster does not transform all people into 
active community emergency managers.  Rather, it results in a significant 
improvement in awareness and preparedness that may reduce, but not 
eliminate vulnerability to future hazards.  Perhaps acceptance of people’s 
limitations and an ability to respond appropriately to a crisis are resilience 
characteristics that communities rely upon. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Understanding, constructing and moving on to improved preparation are 
processes in learning from disasters that are influenced by a kind of distance 
decay effect. Distance decay is a gravity model (based on Newton's law of 
gravity) in which the influence of another place upon any given place is 
contingent upon the size of the other place and its distance away.  This 
influence may be measured in such processes as migration or trade and flow 
of goods.  Disasters outside our local community influence us in the same 
way.  The further away the event is, the bigger it has to be to attract our 
attention.  In distance decay models (used in human geography and 
economics) there are controlling elements in the formula, such as a factor of 
distance and a global constant.  Qualifying factors are consequently things 
like the type of disaster, and the information technology.  The community 
that experiences regular flooding or cyclones, pays greater attention to 
similar events elsewhere because of the commonality of experience, and 
would be much less interested in earthquakes or volcanoes.  Yet, as shown 
above, the experiences of different disaster types can be transferred in terms 
of knowledge and experience.  The Indian Ocean Tsunami demonstrated 
impacts that could be transferred to storm surge, as well as the general 
vulnerability of the coastal zone, tourists, critical infrastructure and 
buildings.  The other qualifying factor, information technology, means that 
well-connected places are more visible.  Researchers learn far more of 
hurricanes in the southern United States than of cyclones in much closer 
areas such as India and the Philippines because of the more ubiquitous 
technology and media of the developed world. 
 
With these qualifying factors modifying the level of knowledge of other 
disasters, the basic rule is that the further an event is from our location the 
less is learnt about it or less attention paid, unless it is bigger, more 
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spectacular, deadly or destructive.  Therefore the following disaster learning 
problems can be summarised in relation to households and communities: 
 
• There is the lack of transfer of knowledge and awareness between 
different types of hazards; 
• Information technology gives emphasis to places, and events, that are 
better connected; 
• Distant events that are learnt about are the biggest, and in a sense, the 
easiest to ignore because they are extreme; 
• Most information is received on the most local events that, most of the 
time, are not extreme disasters - thus communities remain unprepared 
for a truly catastrophic event. 
 
Consequently most communities receive hazard knowledge that reinforces 
complacency.  Most disaster declarations experienced by most communities 
have not involved absolute devastation.  Other local events are similar and 
communities being essentially resilient, they muddle through, prepare 
moderately well for survivable events and are further reinforced in their 
lower-level awareness.  This is quite acceptable for the regular and 
predictable hazards that cause sufficient damage and disruption to warrant a 
disaster declaration, but do not result in devastation or significant loss of life.  
Unfortunately the distance decay effect reinforces the community view that 
terrible things happen a long way away, that our hazards are part of the way 
of life and the pattern of the seasons, and locals cope reasonably well.  Thus 
until the terrible disaster happens locally, most people learn only selected 
lessons from other disasters.  Communities are completely unprepared for 
the catastrophic disaster even when, as in New Orleans in 2005, they knew 
how vulnerable they really were. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
